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Abstract
Social status concerns influence investors’ decisions by driving a wedge in attitudes towards aggregate and idiosyncratic risks. I model such concerns by emphasizing the desire to “get ahead of the Joneses,” which implies that aversion to
idiosyncratic risk is lower than aversion to aggregate risk. The model predicts that
investors hold concentrated portfolios in equilibrium, which helps rationalize the
small premium for undiversified entrepreneurial risk. In the model, status concerns
are more important for wealthier households. Consequently, these households own
a disproportionate share of risky assets, particularly private equity, and experience
greater volatility of consumption, consistent with empirical evidence.

∗

The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, and NBER. I am grateful to John Cochrane,
John Heaton, Tobias Moskowitz, and Pietro Veronesi for their advice and encouragement. I also benefited from comments and suggestions by Andrew Abel, Fernando Alvarez, George-Marios Angeletos,
Nicholas Barberis, Frederico Belo, Hui Chen, Raj Chetty, George Constantinides, Darrell Duffie, Raife
Giovinazzo, William Goetzmann, João Gomes, Luigi Guiso, Lars Hansen, Campbell Harvey (the editor), Erik Hurst, Urban Jermann, Timothy Johnson, Kenneth Judd, Ron Kaniel, Leonid Kogan, David
Laibson, Marlena Lee, Deborah Lucas, Hanno Lustig, Gregor Matvos, Stavros Panageas, Ľuboš Pástor,
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Diversification and risk-sharing are fundamental principles of modern finance
and macroeconomics. However, empirical evidence suggests that household portfolios are
poorly diversified, with many people reporting substantial holdings of a single stock. For
the wealthiest households large shares in closely held businesses constitute a particularly
important source of risk (e.g., Heaton and Lucas (2000a)). It is not surprising that
entrepreneurs bear substantial undiversified risk, since it is important for mitigating
moral hazard and/or adverse selection problems. Yet, from a standpoint of portfolio
theory, entrepreneurship does not appear to be well compensated, implying that many
investors are willing to take poorly rewarded risks despite the availability of superior
investment opportunities such as public equity that earns a large risk premium (e.g.,
Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen (2002), Hall and Woodward (2007)).
In the present paper I interpret these facts by appealing to the human desire for
social status as a key driver of risk-taking behavior. If the satisfaction brought by “getting ahead of the Joneses” outweighs the danger of falling behind, risky activities with
highly idiosyncratic payoffs, such as entrepreneurship, can be particularly attractive.1
Friedman and Savage (1948) suggest that as people move to a higher “social class” their
marginal utility of wealth rises. Consequently, they “take great risks to distinguish
themselves” (p. 299), potentially exhibiting risk-loving behavior. Cole, Mailath, and
Postlewaite (2001) as well as DeMarzo, Kaniel, and Kremer (2004) show that relative
wealth concerns create a wedge in people’s attitudes towards both aggregate risk and
idiosyncratic risk, leading to underdiversified investment portfolios. Building on these
insights, I incorporate preference for social status into a portfolio choice framework in
which heterogeneous households can optimally choose their level of exposure to idiosyncratic risk. The main prediction of my model is that some investors optimally do not
diversify: they hold portfolios concentrated in idiosyncratic assets that earn a positive
average return, such as private equity.
I model social status as an increasing function of individuals’ wealth relative to the
average wealth level, in the spirit of Duesenberry (1949). The key feature of status preferences in my model is that wealthier households care more about their social position
in relation to consumption than do poorer ones. Adam Smith suggested that at higher
levels of income people value the “social esteem” brought on by their wealth more than
the consumption of goods and services that this higher wealth can buy (see Smith (1759),
p. 70). Despite its intuitive appeal, this form of social status concerns has received rel1

Such preferences differ from “keeping up with the Joneses,” for example, as in Abel (1990), where
the risk of falling behind is more important.
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atively little attention in the literature.2 This property implies that investors’ marginal
utility of wealth rises when they “get ahead of the Joneses” (i.e., advance their relative
wealth position). Consequently, they value a marginal dollar of wealth more highly in
bad states of the aggregate economy than in good states, even if their own wealth stays
constant. The sensitivity of marginal utility to economy-wide shocks increases aversion
to aggregate risk and leads investors to reduce their portfolios’ exposure to the public
equity market. Conversely, at any level of risk aversion status-conscious investors load
more heavily on individual-specific (e.g., entrepreneurial) risk, compared to a non-status
seeking investor.
The social status model generates novel predictions for the cross-section of households’ asset holdings. Qualitatively, richer households have a larger fraction of their
wealth invested in individual-specific idiosyncratic assets, such as private equity, as well
as in risky assets generally. Further, the standard deviations of individual portfolio returns as well as consumption growth rates are larger for the households in the upper
half of the distribution. The reason for this heterogeneity is that status has luxury good
properties in my model. At higher wealth levels investors’ sensitivity to their relative
position, and therefore their aversion to aggregate risk, increases, while overall risk aversion declines. Quantitatively, the model is calibrated to match both the overall levels of
risk-taking and the shares of household wealth concentrated in a single risky asset that
are observed in the U.S. data. In particular, I match both the low shares of risky assets
held by low wealth households, and the large, highly concentrated equity shares of the
very wealthy. The large idiosyncratic component of portfolio return risk is what allows
the high levels of risky asset holdings (among the richer households) to be consistent
with a smooth aggregate consumption growth process.
As both a test and an application of the model, I evaluate its ability to match the
empirical dynamics of household wealth. Undiversified idiosyncratic risk manifests itself
as dramatic variation in household wealth both across the population and over time.
Empirically, the cross-sectional distribution of asset holdings in the U.S. is extremely
concentrated, yet at the same time, there is substantial mobility across wealth percentiles
over time (e.g., Hurst, Stafford, and Luoh (1998)). My model is able to account for
much of the variability in wealth holdings at the top of the wealth distribution, since
the richer households bear most of the idiosyncratic risk that drives wealth dispersion.
In the simulated model a third of households in the top 1 % of the wealth distribution
2

Important exceptions are Robson (1992) and Becker, Murphy, and Werning (2005), whose models
of status based on rank feature a similar property.
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are displaced over the course of 10 years, consistent with the data. I conclude that the
dramatic idiosyncratic risk exposure predicted by the model for the wealthiest households
is empirically reasonable.
This paper is organized as follows. The remainder of this introductory section places
the paper in the context of economic literature on social externalities and portfolio choice.
Section I develops the model of social status preferences and describes its qualitative
implications for portfolio allocation. Section II describes the dynamic equilibrium and
the numerical solution of the calibrated model. Section III introduces empirical evidence
and evaluates the model’s ability to explain the quantitative features of the data at both
aggregate and household levels. Section IV concludes.
Social Status and Portfolio Choice: The Setting
A growing literature in psychology, sociology, and, more recently, economics documents the importance of relative wealth or relative income concerns on self-reported
well-being (for example, see Clark and Oswald (1996), Brown, Gardner, Oswald, and
Qian (2005) and Luttmer (2005)). Empirically, the intuition that the importance of
status concerns increases with wealth is consistent with the evidence from subjective
well-being surveys documented by McBride (2001) and Dynan and Ravina (2007).
Preferences featuring social externalities have previously been appealed to in order
to understand the lack of diversification of household portfolios. Such models typically
emphasize herding behavior. For example, DeMarzo, Kaniel, and Kremer (2004) show
that preference for a “local good” can give rise to relative wealth concerns and in turn
to undiversified portfolios, with households in each community tilting their portfolios
toward community-specific assets. In these models investors attempt to “keep up with
the Joneses” and therefore herd by overinvesting in correlated assets. However, these
models are not able to explain large holdings of purely idiosyncratic assets, which is
likely to be an important component of the private equity premium puzzle.
The intuition that the desire to increase relative wealth drives idiosyncratic risktaking bears some resemblance to the behavioral portfolio theory of Shefrin and Statman (2000). These authors propose an objective function that combines “safety” and
“potential,” where the desire for wealth preservation makes low-risk assets the core of
the optimal portfolio while an “aspiration” for higher wealth drives investment in highrisk assets (potentially including negative net present value gambles that have a long
right tail). Their model builds on psychological theories, such as Lopes (1987), that do
4

not tie an aspiration wealth level to relative position. More recently, Haisley, Mostafa,
and Loewenstein (2008) explicitly link aspiration with the notion of “relative deprivation” (i.e., interpersonal comparisons) in a manner consistent with risk-loving behavior,
suggesting a psychological basis for my model.
This paper aims to add to the growing literature that attempts to explain the apparent lack of diversification in household assets. While my model shares some features
with existing ones as well as highlights mechanisms that are quite distinct from those
studied previsouly, it is likely that a combination of approaches will be needed to successfully put together the pieces of the underdiversification puzzle. Among other approaches
are models based on non-expected utility preferences, such as cumulative prospect theory (Barberis and Huang (2008)) and rank-dependent utility (Polkovnichenko (2005)),
model misspecification and learning costs (Uppal and Wang (2003), Van Nieuwerburgh
and Veldkamp (2010)), “familiarity”(Huberman (2001) and Massa and Simonov (2006)),
anticipatory utility and optimism (Brunnermeier and Parker (2005) and Puri and Robinson (2007)). Overconfidence is also cited in explaining entrepreneurial behavior (e.g.,
Bernardo and Welch (2001)). Among the rational theories of entrepreneurship are real
options-based models, such as Polkovnichenko (2003) and Miao and Wang (2007). While
the illiquidity of private business investments might deepen the private equity premium
puzzle (e.g., Kahl, Liu, and Longstaff (2003)), it can also provide a potentially attractive
commitment mechanism that helps mitigate self-control problems (e.g., Laibson (1997)).

I. An Economy with Relative Wealth Concerns
A. Preferences over Consumption and Social Status
I consider a continuum of households, indexed by i ∈ Ω ⊂ R, with a total mass of
one under the associated measure µ.3 The wealth of household i at the beginning of
time period t is denoted by Wti , and the per capita aggregate wealth W̄t is given by
R
W̄t = Ω Wti dµ(i). Each household (or investor) has a finite lifetime of T periods in
which consumption and portfolio decisions are made, and a terminal period in which
the remaining wealth (and status conferred by it) is bequeathed to an heir born in the
beginning of the period. Therefore, there are T overlapping generations, with each new
3

Aggregate wealth, therefore, equals per capita wealth. In a discrete approximation, per capita
i
wealth is defined as W̄t = N1 ΣN
i=1 Wt for some large N .
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generation’s wealth being drawn from the distribution of bequests.
At each time t each investor i aged Ait maximizes
(
Et

τ
X
s=t

"
δ s−t

1−γ

(Csi )
+ η W̄s1−γ
1−γ

µ

Wsi
W̄s

¶#

¡

+ δ τ +1 ψB Wτi+1 , W̄τ +1

¢

)
,

(1)

where τ = t + (T − Ait ).
Households’ preferences are separable in consumption and social status, which is
defined following Bakshi and Chen (1996) as household wealth scaled by the per capita
i

s 4
wealth, W
. Status concerns are often modeled via comparison of individual to per
W̄s
capita consumption (e.g., Abel (1990)), which can be motivated in part by the fact that
consumption is more easily observed by outsiders than wealth. However, some of the
most visible consumption goods are highly durable, for example, houses, cars, boats, and
jewelry, and thus constitute an important part of household asset holdings.5 Ownership

of private businesses can often also be observed by outsiders and thus contributes to the
visibility of entrepreneurs’ wealth.
The use of a separable utility specification for consumption and status in (1) is
primarily motivated by its simplicity, and is in line with much of the literature on social
status (although in contrast to Bakshi and Chen (1996)). In particular, it provides a
parsimonious way of capturing the intuition that status is a “luxury” while consumption
is a “necessity.” The first term in the period utility is the standard power utility over
consumption C; the second term is the utility derived from social status.6 The parameter
that controls the relative importance of consumption and status is η > 0. This parameter
is multiplied by an average wealth term, W̄t1−γ , in order to ensure that the relative
importance of status and consumption in individual utility is invariant to changes in
aggregate wealth over time. A similar structure of period utility is used by Barberis,
Huang, and Santos (2001) to model prospect theory preferences exhibiting loss aversion.
4

In much of the economic literature on positional concerns status is often modeled more generally
as a household’s percentile rank in the cross-sectional distribution of wealth (e.g., Cole, Mailath, and
Postlewaite (1992), Robson (1992)). I choose the simpler specification for convenience and parsimony.
Roussanov (2008) provides conditions under which the more general rank-based models display the key
features analyzed in this paper.
5
Charles, Hurst, and Roussanov (2009) provide evidence that the empirical patterns of consumption expenditures on such visible goods are consistent with individuals signaling their unobservable wealth. In the Internet Appendix, available on the Journal of Finance website at
http://www.afajof.org/supplements, I analyze a version of my model in which total consumption is
explicitly used as such a signal and show that the central predictions of the model hold in that setting.
6
In the case γ = 1, I assume that the consumption utility is logarithmic.
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The parameter that controls the importance of bequest is ψ ≥ 0. The bequest utility
is specified as a function over terminal wealth B that has the same functional form
as the period utility over consumption, including both the absolute and the relative
components:
¡ i ¢1−γ
µ i ¶
¡ i
¢
Wτ +1
Wτ +1
1−γ
B Wτ +1 , W̄τ +1 =
+ η W̄τ +1
.
(2)
1−γ
W̄τ +1
This structure mirrors that of the period utility over consumption and status, in the
sense that utility is derived both from the absolute size of the bequest (the first term)
and from its size relative to the average wealth that determines its status value (the
second term). This specification implies that the bequest motive is of a “warm glow”
rather than a dynastic nature, that is, the person leaving a bequest cares about its size
and not directly about his heirs’ utility. This interpretation is consistent with the notion
of status-driven wealth accumulation, as it can rationalize bequests to charities and large
estates left by people with no heirs (see the discussion in Carroll (2000)). At the same
time, such a specification of bequest utility could be given an altruistic interpretation
in a model where relative wealth concerns are endogenous and the utility of future
generations depends directly on their relative wealth position, as in Cole, Mailath, and
Postlewaite (1992).

B. Technology and Market Structure: Aggregate vs. Idiosyncratic Risk
I model aggregate and idiosyncratic risk exposures via different assets available to
investors. This approach follows Heaton and Lucas (2004), who consider entrepreneurs’
portfolio choice and capital structure decisions jointly. This is in contrast to much of
the existing literature. Portfolio choice models with agent-specific idiosyncratic risk
commonly assume that the “amount” of such risk is exogenously fixed, usually in the
form of a stream of labor or proprietary income. Conversely, models of entrepreneurial
choice (e.g., Cagetti and De Nardi (2006)) usually abstract from the composition of
financial portfolios.
A wide variety of investment opportunities provide a choice between aggregate and
idiosyncratic risk, which poses a modeling challenge. I limit the set of assets available to
households for the sake of tractability. In the model, every household can invest in three
linear technologies with returns given by vector Ri = [Rf , Ra , Ri ]. These investment
opportunities are:
• riskless storage technology with return Rf ,
7

• common risky technology (“public equity”) with return Ra , and
• idiosyncratic risky technology (“private equity”) with return Ri , which is individualspecific.
The specification of the investment opportunities considered here captures the idea
that investors might be able to choose the combination of aggregate and idiosyncratic
risk optimally. This type of investment decision is meant to encompass human capital
(career choice) as well as entrepreneurial investment. I assume that all households have
access to the entrepreneurial technology.
The individual specific returns can be written as
Ri − Rf = αi + β i (Ra − Rf ) + ²i ,
where E[²Ri |Ra ] = 0. I allow the return on the individual-specific investment to contain
an idiosyncratic component that is associated with a nonzero risk premium, that is,
in general αi 6= 0. With some abuse of terminology, I label this technology “private
equity.”Market incompleteness (i.e., agents cannot invest in each others’ private asset)
is important in that it allows idiosyncratic risk to be compensated by positive expected
returns (αi > 0) without creating arbitrage opportunities.
The evolution of an individual household’s wealth is given by
¡
¢ i
i
Wt+1
= Wti − Cti θt 0 Rit+1 ,

(3)

h
i
where the vector of portfolio allocations to the three assets is given by θti = 1 − θti − θ̃ti , θti , θ̃ti .
The evolution of aggregate wealth is driven by the public equity return, since the
idiosyncratic components of individual-specific private equity returns average out by the
law of large numbers. In particular, aggregate wealth is given by
´i
h
h
¢i
¢ ¡
¡
¢³
¡
W̄t+1 = Et Wti 1 − Cti 1 − θti − θ̃ti Rf + Et Wti 1 − Cti θ̃ti αi + ²it+1
´i
h
¡
¢³
a
,
+ Et Wti 1 − Cti θti + θ̃ti β i Rt+1

(4)

where the expectations are taken with respect to the cross-sectional distribution µ as
well as idiosyncratic return realizations, so that the first two terms depend only on the
information available at time t and only the last term depends on the realization of the
public equity return at time t + 1.
8

Under rational expectations households make their decisions at each time t based
on the above law of motion of aggregate wealth, taking it as exogenous. This gives rise
to a notion of equilibrium in which all households correctly guess the consumption and
portfolio choices of all other agents encompassed in this law of motion when making
their own decisions.

C. Optimal (Un)Diversification
Consider a one-period version of the model, in which investors maximize expected
£ ¡
¢¤
utility over end-of period wealth and status E U W i , W̄ , where
¡
¢ (W i )1−γ
U W i , W̄ =
+ η W̄ 1−γ
1−γ

µ

Wi
W̄

¶
.

(5)

Under this specification marginal utility of wealth is positive, while the first derivative
with respect to aggregate reference wealth is negative (suppressing the i superscripts):
µ
UW = W

−γ

+ η W̄

−γ

> 0 and UW̄ = −γη W̄

−γ

W
W̄

¶
< 0 since γ, η > 0.

This is intuitive since, holding individual wealth fixed, an increase in per capita wealth
reduces the individual’s relative status and utility. While my model does not rely directly
on this monotonicity of utility as a function of aggregate wealth, it is a commonly
assumed feature in the literature on interdependent preferences (often referred to as
“jealousy” - e.g., Dupor and Liu (2003)).
Investors’ attitudes towards risk and, consequently, their portfolio allocations are
determined by the properties of the marginal utility of wealth. Consider the problem of
maximizing ethe xpected utility above subject to the constraint
i
h
¢
¡
W i = W0i Rf + θi Ri − Rf + θ̃i (Ra − Rf ) .
It follows from (4) that the aggregate wealth process can be written as
£
¤
W̄ = W̄0 ξ0 + ξ1 (Ra − Rf ) ,
where the constants ξ0 and ξ1 are pinned down by aggregating asset demands over
households and applying the law of large numbers to the idiosyncratic components of
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their portfolio returns.
The first-order conditions of the portfolio problem yield the standard Euler equations
for each asset’s return in excess of the risk-free rate (denoted generically as Rx ):
£
¡
¢ ¤
E UW W i , W̄ Rx = 0.
¡
¢
The first-order Taylor expansion of the marginal utility function around W0i , W̄0
gives

¡
¢
¡
¢
¡
¢¡
¢
UW W i , W̄ = UW W0i , W̄0 + UW W W0i , W̄0 W i − W0i
¡
¢¡
¢
¡
¢,
+UW W̄ W0i , W̄0 W̄ − W̄0 + o W i , W̄

(6)

so that, ignoring higher-order terms, the Euler equation can be written approximately
as

("
E

UW +

´ # )
¡ i
¢
f
i
a
f
R + θ R − R + θ̃ (R − R ) − 1
Rx = 0.
¡
¢
a
f
+UW W̄ W̄0 ξ0 + ξ1 (R − R ) − 1

UW W W0i

³

f

i

The approximated Euler equations that determine optimal portfolio shares of the
two risky assets weigh their expected returns against their pure wealth risk (covariance
with the total portfolio return) and aggregate-wealth risk (covariance with the aggregate
wealth growth):
¡
¢
³
´
¡
¢
UW W W0i , W̄0 W0i
¡ i
¢ Cov Rx , θi Ri − Rf + θ̃i (Ra − Rf )
E [R ] = −
UW W0 , W̄0
¡
¢
¡
¢
UW W̄ W0i , W̄0 W̄0
¡ i
¢ Cov Rx , ξ1 (Ra − Rf ) .
−
UW W0 , W̄0
x

(7)

This expression closely resembles the Intertemporal CAPM relation of Merton (1973).
Individual risk preferences are controlled by the partial derivatives of the marginal utility
of wealth with respect to the two state variables, own wealth and per capita wealth of
the economy. The former derivative, denoted by UW W , represents aversion to all wealth
gambles. The latter, UW W̄ , captures the attitude towards gambles that are correlated
with aggregate wealth. When UW W < 0 the consumer is risk averse and when UW W > 0
the consumer is risk seeking. Similarly, when UW W̄ < 0 the consumer dislikes aggregate
risk (in addition to its contribution to own wealth risk), whereas when UW W̄ > 0 the
consumer seeks additional exposure to aggregate risk, relative to a no-status benchmark.
U
Wi
The term that multiplies the first covariance in the equation above (− WUWW 0 ) is the
Arrow-Pratt coefficient of relative risk aversion (RRA). By analogy, we can name the
10

term that multiplies the second covariance (− UWUW̄WW̄0 ) coefficient of relative aggregatewealth risk aversion (RAWRA).
Under the preference specification (5) above, UW W̄ < 0 and, consequently, agents
are averse to aggregate wealth risk above and beyond its contribution to own wealth
risk. From (7) it can be seen that investors require a higher expected return on assets
that are more positively correlated with the public equity return (provided that ξ1 > 0),
even holding their contribution to the total portfolio variance fixed. Solving for portfolio
demands yields
"

θi
θ̃

i

#

UW
=−
Σ−1
UW W W0i

"

¡
¢ #
E Ri − Rf
a

f

E(R − R )

U
W̄0
− ξ1 W W̄ i Σ−1
UW W W0

"

βi
1

#

¡
¢
V ar Ra − Rf ,

where Σ is the covariance matrix of the public and private equity returns. The first
term gives the standard mean-variance efficient portfolio weights, and the second term
represents the Merton-type hedging demand that reduces the weights of assets in proportion to their aggregate risk betas (the latter term is negative while the former is
positive). In particular, the private equity allocation of the status-seeking investor, as
a fraction of total wealth, approaches that of a power-utility investor with a coefficient
U
Wi
of relative risk aversion equal to − WUWW 0 as the beta of the private equity approaches
zero, while the public equity allocation is always lower. Consequently, the lower is the
beta of private equity, ceteris paribus, the greater is the relative share of private equity
in the household’s risky assets.
The above discussion relies on the first-order approximation of marginal utility of
wealth. The effect of the “getting ahead of the Joneses” property on portfolio allocations
can also be seen without an approximation of marginal utility if we rule out differences
in higher order moments. In the special case of the model where the initial wealth
distribution is degenerate (i.e., W0i = W0 for all i), public and private equity returns are
independent and identically distributed, and there is no riskless asset, it can be shown
that in the unique rational expectations equilibrium, θi , the portfolio share invested in
the idiosyncratic asset, is identical across investors and increasing in the status weight
η, ranging between one-half (the power utility allocation) and one (details are in the
Internet Appendix).
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D. Getting Ahead of the Joneses
The property that marginal value of wealth is decreasing in aggregate wealth (UW W̄ <
0) represents investors’ desire to get ahead of the Joneses. This property captures
the idea that an increase in aggregate wealth, holding individual wealth fixed, lowers
marginal utility of wealth. This is in contrast to “keeping up with the Joneses” (UW W̄ >
0), which raises marginal utility when the aggregate reference level is high.7 The latter
property is the one shared by most of the models of interdependent preferences used in
the finance literature, including Abel (1990), Gali (1994), Bakshi and Chen (1996), and
Campbell and Cochrane (1999).
The intuition for “getting ahead of the Joneses” is that an increase in relative status,
holding individual wealth constant, raises marginal utility of wealth (Friedman and
Savage (1948), Becker, Murphy, and Werning (2005)). Since status is an increasing
function of the ratio of own wealth to reference wealth, as defined in (1), a decrease in
aggregate wealth raises some people’s status, making them better off but also raising
their marginal utility of wealth. The latter effect causes them to avoid assets that pay
off poorly in such states. In contrast, under “keeping up with the Joneses,” investors
overweigh assets that comove with aggregate wealth, since it is particularly painful for
them to experience low consumption when aggregate wealth is high. This would lead to
“underinvestment” in individual-specific assets and “herding” towards assets common to
the reference group (e.g., as in DeMarzo, Kaniel, and Kremer (2004) and Gollier (2004)).
It is not obvious ex ante whether “getting ahead” or “keeping up” preferences are
more relevant for modeling individual decision making. However, when modeling status
preferences at the micro level, it is reasonable to require that relative status be treated
by consumers as a luxury good, more important for the rich than than for the poor,
whose basic consumption needs are more urgent. This assumption agrees with the
existing survey evidence that wealthier people are more concerned with their relative
position (e.g., McBride (2001) and Dynan and Ravina (2007)). The luxury feature of
status preferences is captured here by the additive structure of utility and by its greater
curvature with respect to consumption than with respect to relative wealth. Status
can be a luxury good in the sense that the intratemporal marginal rate of substitution
– the ratio of marginal utility of consumption to marginal utility of status (defined,
7

The taxonomy of Dupor and Liu (2003) uses a slightly different but equivalent definition of “keeping
up with the Joneses.”
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respectively, as c = W i and s =

Wi
)
W̄

8
– is decreasing in individual
h wealth. i The one
1
period specification of my model can be written as u(c, s) = c1−γ 1−γ
+ ηsγ , so that
the MRS is given by

uc
s1−γ
= [1 + η (1 − γ) sγ ]
=
us
cηγ

µ

µ
1 + η (1 − γ)

Wi
W̄

¶γ ¶

(W i )−γ γ−1
W̄ ,
ηγ

which is a decreasing function of own wealth W i (holding aggregate wealth fixed).
Various standard formulations of social externalities that feature “keeping up with
the Joneses” do
³ not
´ possess this luxury property of status. Consider the utility function
i

1−γ

1
W
given by 1−γ
, which is similar to the utility specifications analyzed by Abel
W̄
(1990) and Gali (1994). The marginal utility of relative wealth, that is, the derivative
³ i ´−γ
i
W
with respect to s = W
is
. Differentiating this expression with respect to
W̄
W̄
³ i ´−γ−1
< 0. Therefore, the importance of status
absolute wealth obtains −γ W̄ −1 W
W̄
declines with wealth. Under this specification of preferences the consumer derives utility
only from status, so that marginal utility between consumption and status is not well

defined. For a range of similar preference specifications that exhibit “keeping up with
the Joneses” and that can be written in terms of both consumption and status, the MRS
is either independent of or increasing in individual wealth, which is inconsistent with
the idea that status is a luxury good (see discussion in the Internet Appendix).

E. Cross-sectional Heterogeneity
The “getting ahead of the Joneses” property of status preferences implies a wedge
between relative risk aversion towards any wealth gambles, and relative aversion to
risk that is correlated with per capita wealth. Further, the effect of “getting ahead
of the Joneses” increases with relative wealth in a nonlinear fashion, driving down the
risk aversion of the wealthiest investors and thus increasing their optimal exposure to
idiosyncratic risk.
To illustrate this feature of the model, we can compute the relevant measures of risk
aversion as functions of the state variables. The Arrow-Pratt coefficient of relative risk
8

Ikeda (2006) defines quasi-luxury goods in a similar fashion and discusses conditions under which
such goods are luxuries in the usual sense.
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aversion (RRA) of agent i is given by
−γ

RRA = −

W i UW W
γ (W i )
γ
=
=
¡ i ¢γ ,
−γ
UW
(W i ) + η W̄ −γ
1+η W
W̄
Wi

which is decreasing in relative wealth, W̄t+1
, and is bounded from above by γ, its limit
t+1
at zero wealth. This coefficient tends to zero as relative wealth grows.
To measure investors’ desire to “get ahead of the Joneses,” we can similarly calculate
the relative aversion to aggregate wealth risk (RAWRA), which generates a Merton-type
hedging demand that stems from the state-dependence of the utility function. Define
RAW RA = −

γη W̄ −γ
γη
W̄ UW W̄
=
=
,
¢
¡
−γ
i
W −γ
UW
(W i ) + η W̄ −γ
+
η
W̄

which is an increasing function of relative wealth, with the upper limit equal to γ. The
lower limit as relative wealth falls is zero. Thus, the poorest individuals, while most
risk averse, are the least averse to aggregate risk. Conversely, the wealthiest individuals
are the least averse to pure wealth gambles, but also the most sensitive to aggregate
fluctuations. The degree of divergence in risk attitudes for intermediate values of relative
wealth is controlled by the magnitude of η, the status weight. The greater this parameter
is, the steeper is the decrease in risk aversion and the increase in aversion to aggregate
risk as relative wealth goes up. When η = 1 the two types of risk aversion are of equal
Wi

= 1). For η > 1 the
magnitudes for the average investor (i.e., for i such that W̄t+1
t+1
aggregate risk aversion overtakes the RRA coefficient at lower relative wealth levels.
Figure IV plots these two measures of risk aversion – RRA and RAWRA – as functions
i
, for the case γ = 10, η = 1. The sum of the two measures of
of relative wealth, si = W
W̄
risk aversion in this example is constant across wealth levels and equal to γ.9
[ - Figure 1 about here - ]
The cross-sectional differences in risk attitudes stem from the fact that these preferences exhibit more curvature with respect to consumption than with respect to (relative) wealth. Status is treated by consumers as a luxury: as consumption increases its
9

This suggests that the social status model might in some cases have exactly the same aggregate
asset pricing implications as the standard power utility model. For example, in the case of a degenerate
initial wealth distribution and no idiosyncratic asset,£ the first-order
approximation for the marginal
¤
utility (7) collapses to the usual CRRA expression E Ra − Rf = γθ∗ V ar (Ra ), where θ∗ = θi = ξ1 .
See the Internet Appendix for a discussion.
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marginal utility falls, whereas marginal utility of status is flat, so that the marginal value
of a unit of wealth does not decrease as fast. This drives down the risk aversion towards
pure wealth gambles among wealthier individuals. Since relative wealth position is a
luxury, the strength of the “getting ahead of the Joneses” motive increases with wealth,
driving up the aversion to aggregate risk. Carroll (2002) argues that a preference for
wealth as a luxury good is key to explaining the heterogeneity in portfolio composition
across households, in particular the fact that the rich save a larger fraction of their
wealth than the poor and that they hold a much larger share of risky assets (including
entrepreneurial ventures) in their portfolios.

F. The Role of Skewness
In a situation where the marginal utility is highly nonlinear as a function of either
own wealth or aggregate wealth, the approximation might not be very accurate and
the higher-order moments of returns (such as skewness) might play a role in individual
portfolio allocation. Considering higher-moment properties of returns is particularly
relevant when considering investments in which tail payoffs are especially important,
such as entrepreneurial ventures. Continuing the Taylor expansion of the marginal utility
of wealth (6) to the second order as in Harvey and Siddique (2000), we obtain
¡
¢
¡
¢
¡
¢¡
¢
UW W i , W̄ = UW W0i , W̄0 + UW W W0i , W̄0 W i − W0i
¡
¢¡
¢2
¡
¢¡
¢ 1
+UW W̄ W0i , W̄0 W̄ − W̄0 + UW W W W0i , W̄0 W i − W0i
¡ i
¢¡ i
¢ ¡2
¢
i
+UW W W̄ W0 , W̄0 W − W0 W̄ − W̄0
¡
¢¡
¢2
¡
¢
1
+ UW W̄ W̄ W0i , W̄0 W̄ − W̄0 + o W i , W̄ ,
2
which leads to the equation determining optimal portfolio weights
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¡ i
¢
−
Cov Rx , ξ12 (Ra − Rf )2 ,
2
UW W0 , W̄0
x

since UW W W̄ = 0 under the preference specification considered here. Note that the
term multiplying the covariance of excess return with the squared return on the optimal
portfolio can be interpreted as the relative preference for skewness following Kraus and
Litzenberger (1976) and Harvey and Siddique (2000). Whenever this term is negative
it implies that investors are willing to accept a lower expected return on an asset that
exhibits greater co-skewness with the optimal wealth return. Therefore, an asset with
greater skew will receive a higher weight in the optimal portfolio, holding all else equal.
Similarly, the term multiplying the covariance of excess return with the squared return
on the aggregate asset captures the preference for co-skewness with the market.
Under the status preferences, relative preference for skewness inherits the crosssectional properties of relative risk aversion:
−γ

2

RP S = −

W i UW W W
1 γ (1 + γ) (W i )
1 γ (1 + γ)
=−
=
−
¡ ¢γ .
−γ
2UW
2 (W i ) + η W̄ −γ
2 1 + η Wi
W̄

Specifically, preference for positive skew (or, aversion to negative skew) is greatest in
the limit of zero relative wealth, coinciding with the power utility value of γ(1+γ)
, and
2
declines to zero as relative wealth grows to infinity. Thus, the poor investors value
positive skewness the most and the wealthy investors the least.
Analogously, we can define a measure of relative preference for co-skewness with
aggregate wealth:
W̄02 UW W̄ W̄
1 γ (1 + γ) W̄ −γ
1 γ (1 + γ) η
RP AW CS = −
.
=−
= − ¡ i ¢−γ
−γ
i
−γ
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2 W
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Again, similar to the aversion to aggregate wealth risk, preference for aggregate wealth
co-skew is increasing in relative wealth, with the lower bound of zero and approaching
γ(1+γ)
as relative wealth grows to infinity. These features of marginal utility have the
2
following interpretation: while poorer investors prefer assets that have a large upside
(even with low probability), wealthier investors seek assets that perform well when the
aggregate wealth return takes extreme (positive or negative) values (e.g., options on the
stock market index).
For assets with highly idiosyncratic (in the sense of low public equity beta) and
positively skewed payoffs, the “getting ahead of the Joneses” property and the preference
for positive skew make different cross-sectional predictions within the framework of the
status model. While skewness implies that the attractiveness of the private equity asset
is decreasing in wealth, the “getting ahead of the Joneses” property implies that it
rises with wealth. The resulting pattern of individuals’ investments in entrepreneurial
private equity thus depends on the relative magnitudes of these two effects. Given that
the skewness preference is of second-order importance relative to risk aversion for low
values of utility curvature γ, for poorer households preference for skewness is more likely
to be revealed through low-cost activities (e.g., buying lottery tickets, as long as they
represent positive net present value gambles) rather than entrepreneurial investment,
which requires substantial outlays and carries large downside risk as well as upside
potential. As long as the skewness of private equity returns is only moderately positive,
we can expect the declining risk aversion effect to dominate and therefore its portfolio
share to increase with wealth. In the case in which private equity exhibits positive coskewness with the public equity asset, the latter prediction is reinforced since under the
“getting ahead of the Joneses” model, wealthier investors have a stronger preference for
co-skewness with aggregate wealth.

G. Relative vs. Absolute Status
Since in my model investors have decreasing relative risk aversion it is important to
compare and contrast the model’s predictions with other models that fall into this class.
One such model that is most closely related to mine in spirit as well as structure is
the Capitalist Spirit model of Carroll (2002). In his model households care about both
consumption and type of status derived from the absolute (rather than relative) level of
wealth. Increasing risk tolerance as a function of wealth follows from the status motive
acting as a luxury relative to consumption, so that the rich can afford to take a greater
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amount of risk. In my model, status, which is given by relative wealth, is also a luxury
in the sense that is it more valuable to a wealthier household. Similarly, Wachter and
Yogo (2007) rationalize the upward sloping portfolio shares of risky assets as a function
of wealth within a model that explicitly features luxury goods consumption. Even with
decreasing risk aversion, the more standard portfolio-theoretic models typically predict
that household financial portfolios are well diversified, making it difficult to match both
the level and the concentration of risky asset holdings.
Consider an economy in which investors maximize
(
Et

τ
X
s=t

"
δ s−t

#
¡ i ¢1−γ )
1−γ
Wτ +1
(Csi )
+ ηWsi + δ τ +1 ψ
.
1−γ
1−γ

This specification of preferences is similar to the Carroll (2002) model in terms of its
central features and at the same time has the same number of parameters (and essentially
the same structure) as the model developed in this paper. In the Internet Appendix
I show that this model has the same structure of demands for pure wealth gambles
as the relative wealth model, except that the coefficients of risk aversion and skewness
preference are functions of absolute rather than relative wealth. However, since aggregate
wealth does not enter preferences directly in this model, at any level of wealth the
allocation to private equity is determined solely by its contribution to the properties
of the total portfolio return (i.e., variance, skewness, and potentially higher moments).
This is in contrast to the relative wealth model, where the private asset’s comovement
with aggregate wealth has a separate role in determining its portfolio share. When
individuals’ marginal utility does not depend on aggregate wealth directly, this implies
that households’ optimal portfolios are well diversified and closely resemble the aggregate
stock market index. Consequently, the Capitalist Spirit model or similar models with
decreasing relative risk aversion are unlikely to share the ability of the relative wealth
model to match the level of entrepreneurial portfolio concentration, generate allocation
to the idiosyncratic asset that is increasing in wealth, and thus explain the portfolio
compositions of the wealthy households.

II. Quantitative Analysis
This section defines the equilibrium concept associated with the dynamic version of
the model and the calibration of model quantities to aggregate data.
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A. Equilibrium Dynamics
Each household i aged Ait at time t solves the recursive problem
(
V (Wti , W̄t , Ait ; It ) = max
C,θ

)
1−γ
i
¯
£
¤
(Cti )
W
i
+ η W̄t1−γ t + δE V (Wt+1
, W̄t+1 , Ait+1 ; It+1 )¯ It ,
1−γ
W̄t
(8)

subject to the resource constraint (3) and the law of motion of aggregate wealth (4),
where It denotes the set containing all information up to time t, available to all households. This dynamic programming problem can be simplified by taking advantage of
scale-independence and the fact that agents cannot influence their current-period status
(see the Internet Appendix for details).
Since aggregate wealth is a state variable that enters the objective function of each
household, optimal consumption and investment policies that solve (8) generally depend
on the wealth distribution and its evolution. Because of the heterogeneity in consumption and investment choices across wealth levels, the wealth distribution affects the
evolution of aggregate wealth (4) via aggregation of individual wealth portfolios. This
law of motion is exogenous to any individual household, but under rational expectations
it must be consistent with all households’ optimal decisions. The expression in (4) can
be written as
W̄t+1
a
= ξ0 (It ) + ξ1 (It ) Rt+1
,
W̄t
where ξ0 (It ) and ξ1 (It ) are determined in equilibrium and can vary over time reflecting
shifts in the wealth distribution. Therefore, requiring aggregate wealth dynamics to be
consistent with equilibrium implies that the state space, which includes the space of
wealth distributions, is potentially infinite-dimensional.
In practice the coefficients in the law of motion can be approximated very well by
constants (or, more generally, simple functions of lagged aggregate wealth growth). Such
an approximation simplifies the problem dramatically, making it possible to obtain a numerical solution and calibrate the model (this is a special case of the approach proposed
by Krussell and Smith (1998)). My approximation procedure consists of solving the individual optimization problems, simulating future wealth distributions for a large number
of periods using the optimal policies, updating the resulting law of motion for aggregate
wealth by projecting its simulated path on the public equity return realizations, and repeating the procedure until the law of motion stabilizes. The computational procedure
is detailed in the Internet Appendix.
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B. Parametrization
I solve the model for T = 7 periods so that each period corresponds to a 10-year
investment horizon. Thus, if the youngest agents enter the model at age 20 then the last
decision-making period corresponds to the age of 80 years. Table I lists the parameters
of the investment opportunity set as well as the benchmark values of preference parameters. The unconditional means of the stock return and the risk-free rate (i.e., 10-year
Treasury bond yield) approximately match those in the U.S. data, at annualized values
(for corresponding logarithmic returns) of 11% and 5%, respectively.10 The risk-free rate
is constant.
[ - Table I about here - ]
The equity returns are i.i.d. I assume that the expected excess return on the idiosyncratic asset is equal to the public equity premium, consistent with the findings
of Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen (2002). I assume that the standard deviation of
the idiosyncratic project/private equity return is three times as high as that of public
equity, which is similar to the volatility of publicly traded individual stocks (see Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu (2001)). This implies annualized standard deviations of
public and private equity logarithmic returns of 15% and 45%, respectively. Heaton and
Lucas (2004) and Polkovnichenko (2003) consider similar volatility levels in calibrating
entrepreneurial project hurdle rates. Alternatively, one could use data on the returns
to private equity and/or venture capital investments to calibrate the private equity returns. It is not clear whether returns accruing to private equity funds are representative
of returns accruing to individual entrepreneurs, since fund returns aggregate individual
investments, reducing idiosyncratic risk.
I model public and private equity returns as jointly lognormally distributed and use
Gauss-Hermite quadrature (with 10 nodes along either dimension) to evaluate expectations (e.g., Judd (1999)). In the benchmark calibration I allow private equity returns to
covary positively with public equity by setting β i = 0.5. This is qualitatively consistent
with the empirical evidence in Heaton and Lucas (2000b) that income streams from
proprietary businesses are positively correlated with the stock market return. For the
10

This assumption overstates the real risk-free rate in the data; however, it allows me to sidestep the
tension generated by the equity premium and risk-free rate puzzles in calibrating aggregate portfolio
holdings. Since explaining these puzzles is not the focus of this paper, I parameterize the model to
make them less pronounced.
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two-state public equity return process I use this beta to restrict the conditional mean of
the private equity return in each of the aggregate states.
The initial wealth distribution used as a starting point for the iterative procedure is
calibrated using the percentiles of the U.S. wealth distribution from the 2001 Survey of
Consumer Finances (SCF). Table I displays the set of points used to approximate the
distribution.

C. Calibration
In order to calibrate the key parameters of the status model, namely, the consumption
utility curvature γ and the status utility weight η, I simulate the model’s solution for a
range of parameter values and compare its quantitative predictions at the aggregate level
to the data. The empirical and simulated moments for the aggregate quantities of interest
are displayed in Table II. The primary targets of my calibration are two key statistics of
the data on individual household portfolio allocations: average holdings of risky assets
(specifically, public and private equity) and the degree of portfolio concentration. I
choose preference parameters so as to closely match these two moments of household
portfolio holdings.11 I use data from the 2001 SCF to estimate the average share of
household assets allocated to risky assets (including stocks, mutual funds, corporate
bonds, private businesses, etc.) and the average share allocated to “concentrated equity,”
the household’s largest risky asset holding (such as a private business or an individual
stock). I only consider households that report positive holdings of risky assets, since in
my model all households are marginal in the stock market as there are no costs associated
with stock market participation. A detailed description of the data can be found in the
Internet Appendix. The model counterparts of these moments are the average share of
wealth allocated to risky assets (both public and private equity) and the average share
of private equity.
[ - Table II about here - ]
In addition, I use the set of empirical facts about aggregate consumption growth
volatility to constrain my calibration. I compare the standard deviations (annualized, in
percentage points) of average logarithmic consumption growth generated by the model
for a range of parameter values with those from the U.S. data. The reported consumption
11

Piazzesi and Schneider (2007) propose a framework for modeling both asset prices and quantities
endogenously in a similar portfolio choice context; here I focus on quantities taking prices as exogenous.
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volatility measures are based on estimates obtained using micro data from the Consumer
Expenditure Survey (CEX). The estimates of volatility of average consumption growth
are from Malloy, Moskowitz, and Vissing-Jørgensen (2005), and the average consumption growth volatility is based on the quarterly estimates of Wachter and Yogo (2007);
both studies use CEX household consumption expenditure data for nondurable goods
and services. I also report the standard deviation of growth in the logarithm of per
capita consumption from NIPA. These comparisons should be viewed with some caution, since the model numbers are based on 10-year periods, whereas consumption data
are based on quarterly consumption growth observations (however, Malloy, Moskowitz,
and Vissing-Jørgensen (2005) estimate a growth rate of quarterly consumption over long
horizons, whereas I use the 20-quarter estimate). Household-level consumption data are
available in the CEX for less than 25 years, making it difficult to estimate the volatility
of consumption growth between 10-year periods. Still, since the aggregate consumption
process is close to a random walk at the annual frequency, this problem might not be
too severe.
Alongside the empirical estimates of consumption volatility the table displays corresponding quantities obtained using simulated data produced by the social status model
for the consumption curvature parameter γ = 14 and status weight η = 1, values chosen
to approximately match the empirical quantities. I also report the corresponding model
quantities for the case η = 0 (i.e. standard constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) preferences with no status concerns) and γ = 16, which is also chosen so as to best match
the target moments. I also calibrate a version of the Capitalist Spirit model outlined in
Section I to the two moments of portfolio holdings.
The social status model can match the average portfolio shares fairly closely. The
model slightly understates the average share of risky assets (allocation to equity, both
public and private, in total assets), at 26% vs. 28% in the data. The model matches
the degree of portfolio concentration at the aggregate level almost exactly, producing
the 17% of total equity concentrated in the “single largest asset” (vs. 12% in the data).
Consequently, the model only slightly overstates the average fraction of total assets devoted to private equity, at 6%. The model can match these asset quantities without
dramatically overshooting the volatility of consumption growth. The annualized standard deviation of growth rate in the logarithm of per capita consumption growth is
twice as high in the model as in the data (3.4 versus 1.71%), but the former number
aggregates over both stockholders and non-stockholders. The volatility of average con-
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sumption growth, which is measured in the data only including stock-owing households,
is matched much more closely, at 4.6 and 5.6% in the data and in the model, respectively.
The model also overstates the average individual consumption volatility by almost four
percentage points, although the empirical estimate is conservative because it aims to
reduce the influence of measurement error and thus potentially eliminates some genuine
idiosyncratic variation; see Wachter and Yogo (2007) for details.
The standard power utility (CRRA) model calibrated similarly to the status model
can match the average allocation to risky assets, but not the allocation to private equity,
producing only half as much portfolio concentration on average (9 vs. 18%). The power
utility curvature implied by this calibration is γ = 16. Despite similar levels of risky
asset holdings the CRRA model overstates aggregate consumption volatility more than
the status model: the volatility of log aggregate consumption growth is 5% and volatility
of the average consumption growth rate is 11%. The difference stems from the fact that
under the CRRA preferences a greater share of individual consumption is affected by
aggregate risk than in the status model. At the same time, the average volatility of
individual consumption growth is higher, at 16%. The reason is that under the status
model, most of the idiosyncratic risk is borne by a small number of households (the
wealthiest ones), whereas under the CRRA model it is distributed evenly across the
population since there are no differences in portfolio shares.
The last column of Table II reports the moments of the Capitalist Spirit model.
Because these preferences are not scale-independent, for simplicity I calibrate a twoperiod version rather than the fully dynamic life-cycle model. As a consequence, I only
report the moments of asset holdings and not of consumption, since the latter are not
directly comparable to the data. Despite the additional degree of freedom, the ability of
this model to match aggregate portfolio holdings is similar to that of the power utility
model. The Capitalist Spirit model with γ = 25 and η = 1 matches the average risky
asset share of 28% exactly, but the concentrated holdings of private equity are too low
at 10%.
Even though the private equity concentration puzzle is less prominent at the aggregate rather than individual level, it appears sufficient to distinguish the social status
model from the more standard models (whether with constant relative risk aversion or
decreasing relative risk aversion), given the parameters of the economic environment
specified above.
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III. Evaluation and Extensions
In this section I evaluate the ability of the social status model to explain quantitative
as well as qualitative features of the data at a disaggregated level. In particular, I assess
the calibrated models’ predictions for the cross-section of individual portfolio allocations
and compare its performance to the more standard alternatives. I show that the social
status model does a better job explaining the cross section of household asset holdings
than the competing models matched to the same aggregate quantities. I also evaluate
the model’s predictions for the individual wealth variability over time as well as discuss
its implications for savings behavior and entry into entrepreneurship.

A. Heterogeneity in Risky Asset Holdings
The main challenge for the portfolio choice model is to explain the heterogeneity in
asset holdings across households, given the constraint imposed by matching the aggregate
quantities. The empirical measures of risk-taking and diversification that I analyze
are averages of portfolio shares taken over two subsamples of households, subdivided
into wealth percentile groups. The first subsample includes all “stockholders” defined
broadly as households who own both directly held equity and equity held through mutual
funds or other managed accounts. The second subsample comprises “stockholders with
concentrated holdings,” stockholders that report positive holdings of one of the following:
directly held individual stocks, private business, investment real estate, and other similar
risky assets. As discussed above, my empirical analog of “private equity” in the model
is the single largest asset from the above list owned by a household. In addition, I look
at total “undiversified” equity, which is the sum of all such concentrated holdings (i.e.,
all equity, public and private, that is held directly rather than in managed accounts).
To evaluate the model’s ability to explain portfolio allocation decisions I consider the
variation in the portfolio shares across the wealth distribution. The average allocations
by wealth quantile obtained from the SCF are summarized in Table III. The salient
feature of the data is that both the share of risky assets in households’ portfolios and
the degree of asset concentration in the largest risky asset are increasing in wealth.
[ - Table III about here - ]
Table IV reports the corresponding quantities produced by the calibrated social status model as well as the power utility model. The social status model broadly matches
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the cross-sectional patterns of risky asset holdings (Panel A). The average allocation
among the bottom half of the wealth distribution is around 20 % in the data: 19 for all
stockholders and 24 for those with concentrated equity; the latter number is matched
by the model. Consistently with the data, the share of risky assets in the social status
model is increasing in wealth. At the top 5th percentile of the wealth distribution households in the data invest just over one-half of their wealth in equities, or close to 60% for
concentrated equity-holders, which is captured by the model. For the highest (top 1%)
wealth percentile, the model overshoots the risky asset allocation (63% in the data for
stockholders and 68% for concentrated shareholders), predicting risky asset allocation
of 98%.
The standard power utility model, which features constant portfolio shares across
the wealth distribution, cannot match the heterogeneity in portfolio allocations. The
equity share of 29 % predicted by the CRRA model are not too far from the empirical
estimates for the bottom 90% of the wealth distribution. However, within the top decile
of the distribution, the standard model dramatically understates the level of risky asset
holdings. The more interesting comparison is with the Capitalist Spirit model, which was
designed in part with the aim of explaining the heterogeneity in risky asset holdings.
Indeed, as can be seen in Panel B of Table IV, this model does generate substantial
cross-sectional variation in equity shares. In fact, it produces too much heterogeneity:
it understates the risky asset holdings of the bottom half of the distribution at 15%,
and dramatically overstates the allocations of the rich, predicting that the wealthiest
1% of investors asset positions are 120% in equity. In fairness to the Capitalist Spirit
model, these extreme differences are due in part to the fact that I chose to calibrate a
parsimonious version that has the same number of parameters as the social status model.
The original model in Carroll (2002) has additional parameters, including nonzero direct
utility curvature over wealth, and might be able to match the cross-section of risky asset
holdings with more precision.
[ - Table IV about here - ]

B. Heterogeneity in the Degree of Portfolio Concentration
Explaining the cross-section of portfolio concentration is an even greater challenge.
The social status model does a good job of matching the average portfolio shares allocated to private equity among all stockholders, as well as its increasing profile. The
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model predicts that on average 15% of equity, or 5% of total assets, is concentrated in
the idiosyncratic asset in the lower deciles of the wealth distribution. This is similar to
the average shares in the data for all stockholders (14 and 3%, respectively). Both the
CRRA and the Capitalist Spirit models understate the share of risky assets invested in
private equity, at around 10%, which combines with the overstated level of total equity
holdings to produce exactly the 3% of total assets in the concentrated holding observed
in the data. In the top decile of the distribution, however, the concentration shares increase sharply, up to almost 30% of total assets for the richest 1% of households. Neither
the standard CRRA model nor the Capitalist Spirit model with decreasing relative risk
aversion can match this increase.
The social status model exhibits a sharp increase in concentration shares over the
top wealth percentiles, predicting that 83% of risky asset holdings of the top 1% of
households are comprised of private equity. This prediction appears to overshoot the
average empirical shares of the single largest concentrated equity holding, which stands
at 37% of risky assets. However, if we extend the notion of concentrated investment
to include all “undiversified” equity, the difference becomes less dramatic. In the data,
for households in the top 1% of the wealth distribution and for those in the next 4%,
the average shares of total equity holdings that are undiversified are 77% and 54%,
respectively, corresponding to 51 and 31% of total assets. Conditional on households
having nonzero holdings of such concentrated equity assets, these quantities are even
greater, with 83% of equity held by the top 1% of households in the form of undiversified
investments, thus coming very close to the model’s prediction.
It is difficult to assess the extent to which the model may be overstating underdiversification of the rich using the SCF data. It is possible that some of the equity
positions that I classify as diversified, such as those held in mutual funds and “managed
accounts” are in fact highly exposed to idiosyncratic risk. In particular, it is likely that
some of the managed account holdings of the very wealthy might include hedge fund
and private equity fund investments, which can have large idiosyncratic risk exposure.12
The standard CRRA portfolio model with γ = 16 calibrated to match the same
aggregate quantities cannot match either the heterogeneity in risk taking or the extent of
portfolio concentration among the rich, since it predicts that the portfolios shares do not
vary with wealth. The Capitalist Spirit model predicts that portfolio shares do vary with
12

Calvet, Campbell, and Sodini (2007) document that wealthier households appear to hold betterdiversified portfolios than poorer ones, but at the same time also invest more aggressively, and as a
result are exposed to more idiosyncratic risk.
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wealth. However, unlike the total risky asset holdings, the allocation to private equity
implies by the Capitalist Spirit model is decreasing, rather than increasing, in individual
wealth. This feature of the model can be attributed to the declining preference for
positively skewed payoffs that accompanies decreasing relative risk aversion, as discussed
in section I. The allocation to private equity under standard power utility preferences is
driven by the diversification benefit (i.e., maximizing the portfolio’s Sharpe ratio), but
also by the concerns about higher moments of the portfolio return distribution, such as
skewness. The Capitalist Spirit model behaves similarly to a power utility model with
a certain coefficient of relative risk aversion corresponding to a given wealth level; as
wealth increases both risk aversion and the preference for skewness decrease, so that the
portfolio allocation more closely resembles the mean-variance efficient portfolio.
The ability to match the risky asset holdings and portfolio concentration of the richest
households without generating excessive volatility of aggregate consumption growth is
a distinctive feature of the social status model. The reason the social status model is
able to reconcile the aggregate facts with evidence on the portfolio holdings of the very
wealthy is that it predicts a greater degree of portfolio concentration for investors with
high wealth, relative to the average investor.
The model’s allocations to private equity are empirically plausible in that they generally follow the same increasing pattern as the allocation to undiversified equity holdings
in the data, although the predicted magnitudes are higher for the top wealth groups.
The magnitudes are sufficiently similar to conclude that the model can broadly match
the empirical patterns of risk taking and the degree of portfolio concentration simultaneously. It is possible that some of the heterogeneity in private equity holdings is due to
a combination of luck and illiquidity (or inertia): if portfolio shares representing investments in private businesses are difficult to rebalance, over time they will be positively
correlated with past returns. However, this would imply that entrepreneurial investment
is even costlier from a diversification perspective and therefore more difficult to reconcile
with standard models.

C. Wealth Mobility
In the model, individual consumption growth volatility is sharply increasing in wealth
along with the volatility of portfolio returns, reaching 20% for the wealthiest 5% of households and 37% for the top percentile (Table IV). Much of this volatility is idiosyncratic,
driven by the returns on “private equity.” Does the social status model imply too much
27

variability in individual consumption and wealth, in particular for the richest households? The model does predict high volatility of portfolio returns and consumption
growth for the top 1% of households, at 22 and 37% (log, annualized), respectively. Unfortunately, it is impossible to assess directly whether these quantities are empirically
reasonable. Data on individuals’ portfolio returns are unavailable in the U.S., while
consumption data from the CEX lack sufficiently long panel dimension to estimate individual consumption growth volatility over long horizons. In addition, the CEX does not
do a very good job sampling the wealthiest households. Wachter and Yogo (2007) report
estimates of individual consumption volatility growth by wealth groups; while they do
not consider the top percentile of the distribution, their estimates of coarser groups are
of similar magnitudes to those produced by my model.
In order to evaluate the model’s predictions for the degree of exposure to idiosyncratic
risk I look at the cross-sectional dynamics of household wealth using data from the Panel
Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). Although this data set, like the CEX, undersamples
rich households, it has a long enough panel dimension to estimate changes in household
wealth over 10-year periods, which match the horizon in my simulated model.
While it is well known that the distribution of household wealth in the U.S. is
extremely wide and highly concentrated, there is also a substantial amount of crosssectional wealth mobility over time. I estimate 10-year transition probabilities of wealth
deciles following Hurst, Stafford, and Luoh (1998). They estimate transition probabilities using the PSID wealth supplements over the period 1984 to 1994. I update their
estimates with data from the 1999 supplement. I next adjust the estimated transition
rates to limit the influence of measurement error and, most importantly, to remove
life-cycle accumulation/decumulation effects that are absent in my model, in order to
provide an appropriate benchmark for evaluating the model’s predictions. Details of this
estimation can be found in the Internet Appendix.
Table V displays the probabilities of moving upwards or downwards and staying in the
same percentile group conditional on being in a given wealth quantile at the beginning
of a 10-year period. The empirical transition matrix displays a substantial degree of
mobility, especially in the right tail of the wealth distribution (Panel A). Among the
households in the top 1%, two-thirds are staying in the same decile, and one-third fall
into a lower decile. In the 95th to 99th percentile group, over half of all households
fall behind after 10 years. At the same time, the movement between the top and the
bottom half of the distribution is very limited, with 98% of households in the bottom
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50% remaining there after 10 years.
[ - Table V about here - ]
The social status model is able to generate patterns of social mobility that very
closely mimic those in the data for the top percentiles of the wealth distribution. The
quantitative features of the transition distribution for the status model are summarized
in Table V (Panel B). Note that for the top 1% of the distribution the model matches
the empirical transition probabilities particularly closely, with a quarter of households
moving down into a lower percentile group after the 10-year period. In contrast to
the social status model, the standard power utility model (Panel C) produces highly
persistent cross-sectional wealth distribution, with persistence probabilities of 95% in
the top percentile of the distribution (compared to about 67% in the data and 76 under
the status model). For lower percentile groups the match between the social status model
and the data is less close, but the model still outperforms the neoclassical benchmark.
The Capitalist Spirit model produces even less mobility than the CRRA model (Panel
D). Overall, even though the social status model is not specifically designed to explain
social mobility, it does a good job matching the empirical facts for mobility in the upper
end of the wealth distribution. I therefore conclude that the model’s predictions for the
degree of households’ exposure to idiosyncratic investment risk are reasonable.

D. Entrepreneurship and Concentration
In matching the cross-sectional predictions of the social status model for the degree
of portfolio concentration I have so far ignored the fact that a large fraction of households, even among stockholders, have no concentrated holdings. In the context of the
model, this fact should not be surprising if not all investors have access to idiosyncratic
investment opportunities that earn a positive abnormal return (“alpha”). Separating
households that do own concentrated assets helps to match the model’s predictions for
the idiosyncratic risk exposure of the wealthiest investors’ portfolios. At the same time,
conditioning on participation in the “private equity” market also reveals that the model
dramatically understates the degree of portfolio concentration in the bottom half of the
wealth distribution. As documented in Table III (Panel B), households in the lower half
of the distribution that do own idiosyncratic assets on average have between 80 and 90%
of their total equity concentrated in such investments, which corresponds to 20% of their
total assets. These concentration shares decline somewhat at higher wealth levels before
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displaying the sharp increase in the top 5% group. In contrast, in the model the poorer
households have the lowest concentration shares (3% of total assets allocated to private
equity).
The reason for the discrepancy is not surprising. In the model I allow households to
invest a small fraction of their wealth in private equity. In the data, the concentrated
equity stakes, especially among the poorer households, are driven by business owners.
Given the potential importance of asymmetric information in the private equity market
and in the financing of small businesses, incentive considerations should dictate that
entrepreneurs’ stakes in their businesses must be large relative to their outside assets.
Bitler, Moskowitz, and Vissing-Jørgensen (2005) show that this prediction is indeed
borne out in the data. Still, this does not explain why poorer households choose to
become entrepreneurs if doing so requires a potentially dramatic increase in portfolio and
consumption risk relative to other investment opportunities. For example, setting the
minimum required business owner’s private equity stake to 20% of total assets, which is
consistent with estimates obtained by Bitler, Moskowitz, and Vissing-Jørgensen (2005),
would imply that, in the social status model, only the wealthiest 5% of households find
it optimal to become entrepreneurs. In order to confirm this intuition I solve the model
while restricting the share of private equity to total assets to be at least 20%, or else zero.
Table IV (Panel C) displays the resulting cross-section of private equity shares. Indeed,
they are zero for all households outside of the top decile of the wealth distribution.
One possibility for reconciling the model with the data along this dimension is to
allow for heterogeneity in investment opportunities among investors. In particular, suppose individuals draw idiosyncratic entrepreneurial projects randomly from a distribution of systematic risk exposures. For example, suppose some entrepreneurs have access
to projects that provide a hedge for aggregate risk in the form of a negative beta with
public equity. Then a concentrated investment in such a project might be optimal even
for poorer investors, for whom the status-seeking motive is very weak. Alternatively,
for investors with high consumption curvature γ, and therefore a strong preference for
positive skew, a large positive beta of private equity may be more attractive because it
can magnify the private asset’s contribution to the skewness of the total portfolio (by increasing the co-skewness with the stock market). The bottom line of Table IV (Panel C)
shows private equity shares simulated from the model with the minimum concentration
constraint of 20% and increased systematic risk of private equity: β i = 1.5. It is evident
that in this case even the households in the bottom half of the wealth distribution are
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willing to invest half of their assets in private equity, because it is a good hedge against
the risk of public equity. The probability of drawing a project with high co-skewness
with public equity (or a large diversification benefit) is likely to be small empirically,
however. This is consistent with the huge discrepancy in the rate of participation in the
private equity market reported in Table III between the richer and the poorer households. Only 8% in the bottom half of the wealth distribution own concentrated equity,
compared to 83% of households in the top 1% of the distribution.
An interesting direction for future research would be to calibrate a model with explicit heterogeneity in private equity investment opportunities. One likely prediction is
that the nonlinear effect of “getting ahead of the Joneses” on risk preferences might lead
to a sharp increase in participation rates at the very top of the wealth distribution, with
little variation across lower percentiles. Hurst and Lusardi (2004) find that the relationship between individual wealth and entry into entrepreneurship is highly nonlinear, but
strongly positive only among the top 5% of the distribution. Importantly, liquidity constraints do not appear to be driving the effect of wealth on entry rates, suggesting a role
for preference-based explanations. At the same time, empirically there is some evidence
of a link between concentration of financial portfolios and entrepreneurship: Calvet,
Campbell, and Sodini (2007) report that the financial portfolios of entrepreneurs (not
including their business) are on average less diversified than those of non-entrepreneurs.
This evidence lends further support to the unified view of household diversification offered in this paper.

E. Saving and Consumption Dynamics
The social status model generates considerable heterogeneity in saving rates. The
optimal consumption-wealth ratios reported in Table VI show that the richest 10% of the
households consume a much smaller function of their wealth than the poorest half, and
consequently save more. For example, the youngest households (e.g.,, 20-year olds) at
the bottom half of the wealth distribution consume just over 40% of their initial wealth
(over a 10-year period), as do power utility households, whereas the richest 1% of the
young consume only 14%. The difference is even more dramatic for old households: the
poorer households consume up to 60% of their wealth in the second-to-last period of
their lifetime (i.e., at age 80), while the richest still consume about 14%, thus leaving a
disproportionately large amount of wealth for their heirs. This prediction of the model
is consistent with the stylized empirical observation that the rich elderly do not dissave
31

as predicted by the standard life-cycle model (e.g., see Dynan, Skinner, and Zeldes
(2004)). The intuition for the high saving rate among the very rich is that future status
utility provides additional benefit for saving, above and beyond the desire to smooth
consumption over time. This motive is particularly strong for the wealthy, since future
status is relatively more important to them. This prediction is typical for models where
wealth confers social status; Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (1992) and Corneo and
Jeanne (1999) discuss the “oversaving” effects generated by relative wealth concerns.
The differences in consumption-wealth ratios across the wealth distribution are not
driven by the bequest motive as such. Rather, they are due to the fact that the marginal
utility of wealth is increasing in relative wealth (a consequence of the “getting ahead of
the Joneses” property). This shifts the importance from consumption towards wealth
accumulation as an individual’s wealth grows (relative to the average). Some of the
empirical facts concerning the heterogeneity in savings rates can be explained by other
models in which preferences for bequest are non-dynastic and have luxury good properties (e.g., Carroll (2000), DeNardi (2004)). The social status model possesses this
desirable feature even though it was not specifically designed to explain savings behavior.
In the absence of labor income the simulated savings rates in my model can only
be compared to the data qualitatively (rather than quantitatively). I leave out labor
income in order to focus attention on the endogenous choice of exposure to idiosyncratic
risk, which is driven by relative wealth concerns. The illiquidity of individual human
capital and its depreciation with age can be major determinants of saving behavior as
well as portfolio choice over the life cycle (e.g., see Viceira (2001), Cocco, Gomes, and
Maenhout (2005), Gomes and Michaelides (2005), and Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron
(2007)). However, it is likely that these effects are muted for the very wealthy, whose
investment behavior is the primarily focus of this paper, since for them human capital
is likely to constitute a much smaller fraction of total wealth than for an average U.S.
household. Incorporating labor income into the social status model would be important
for evaluating its predictions for the entire cross-section of households, in particular its
ability to match the observed degree of wealth inequality.
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IV. Conclusion
In this paper I develop a theory of household investment behavior based on the idea
that people care about their relative position, and that wealthier people value status particularly highly. The latter assumption implies that marginal utility of wealth increases
with relative status. Consequently, my model makes the prediction that investors optimally hold undiversified portfolios in equilibrium, overweighing idiosyncratic risk and
under weighing aggregate risk relative to the neoclassical benchmark. This feature of the
model suggests that cross-sectional dispersion in accumulated wealth can be generated
without subjecting agents to exogenous idiosyncratic shocks. Empirically, such shocks
are not sufficient to explain the inequality in consumption and wealth, hinting that undiversified portfolios may be playing an important role (Cochrane (1991), Venti and Wise
(1998), Campbell (2006)). Thus, my model’s ability to rationalize individual portfolio
holdings and resulting wealth dynamics potentially lends support to the argument of
Friedman (1953), who emphasizes the role of individual choice and, in particular, risk
preferences in shaping the distribution of income and wealth.
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Table I
Calibration
This table presents the the model parameters and the percentiles of the wealth distribution used in the calibration. Panel A displays the parameters of the asset returns
used in calibration, annualized via logarithmic returns. The public equity return and
risk-free rate are based on 10-year CRSP value-weighted returns and 10-year Treasury
yields, respectively. The private equity return is calibrated to have the same mean return as public equity, with a standard deviation three times as high. Systematic risk of
private equity is captured by its beta (loading) on public equity. Panel B displays the
range of preference parameter values used in simulations. Panel C contains a discrete
approximation of the wealth distribution used to initialize the simulated model: for each
i
relative wealth level x the fraction of households with wealth below this level, ( W
≤ x)
W̄
is given by F (x). This distribution matches the distribution of households net worth in
the 2001 SCF.
Panel A: Technology parameters
Parameter
Risk-free Rate
Rf
Public Equity Risk Premium
E (Ra ) − Rf
Public Equity Return Volatility σ (Ra )
Private Equity Risk Premiums
E (Ri ) − Rf
Private Equity Return Volatility σ (Ri )
Systematic risk of private equity βRi ,Ra

Value
5%
6%
15%
6%
45%
0.5

Panel B: Preference parameters (status benchmark)
Parameter
Value
Curvature of Consumption Utility γ 14
Status Utility Weight
η 1
Subjective Discount Factor
β 0.9710
Bequest Utility Weight
ψ 1
x
F (x)

Panel C: Initial wealth distribution
0.005 0.013 0.027 0.053 0.133 0.267 0.533 1.333
0.162 0.187 0.219 0.257 0.328 0.447 0.603 0.819
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2.665 5.330
0.920 0.971

Table II
Asset Holdings and Consumption Growth Volatility
The table plresents average portfolio allocations to public and private equity and measures of consumption growth volatility in the U.S. data and in the model. The “Data”
column reports total (public and private) equity as a share of total assets and the
share of assets allocated to concentrated equity (private business or individual stock)
for households with positive equity holdings, obtained from the 2001 SCF, and consumption growth volatility measures, which are annualized logarithmic estimates using
quarterly expenditures: † denotes aggregate consumption from NIPA (5-year horizon),
‡ denotes individual consumption from CEX (5-year horizon), and [ denotes individual
consumption from CEX (quarterly horizon). The “Social Status” column reports moments simulated for the calibrated social status model with γ = 14, η = 1. The ‘CRRA’
column reports moments simulated for the calibrated power utility (η = 0) model with
γ = 16. The “Capitalist Spirit” column reports moments simulated for the calibrated
version of the Capitalist Spirit model with η = 1 and γ = 25. All quantities are in
percentage points.

Equity/total assets
Concentrated/total equity
Conc.
¡ ¡ equity/total
¢¢ assets
σ ¡ln P
C̄t+h¡/C̄t
¢¢
1
i
i
σ P
ln
C
/C
t
t+h
N
¡ ¡ i
¢¢
1
σ ln Ct+h
/Cti
N

Data

Social Status

CRRA

Capitalist Spirit

28
18
5
1.71†
4.6‡
9[

26
17
6
3.4
5.6
12.6

29
9
3
5
11
16

28
10
2
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Table III
Portfolio Allocation: Data
The table displays portfolio allocation measures across percentiles of the wealth distribution. Panel A presents average portfolio shares of households that report owning stocks,
mutual funds, and other publicly traded risky assets (“equity”). Panel B presents average portfolio shares of households that report having concentrated equity stakes, such as
shares of private businesses, individual stocks, investment real estate, etc. Participation
rate is the fraction of households that own such assets. “Concentrated equity” is the
largest of: private business holdings, individual stock holdings, investment real estate
holding, etc. “Undiversified equity” is the sum of all such holdings (i.e., all equity held
directly, outside of mutual funds or other managed accounts).
Wealth percentile

Panel A: All stockholders
Bottom half 50-90 90-95

95-99

Top 1%

Equity/total assets, %
Concentrated/ total equity, %
Concentrated equity/total assets, %

19
14
3

26
17
5

44
20
10

52
27
17

63
37
26

Undiversified/total equity, %
Undiversified equity/total assets, %

19
4

29
9

41
19

54
31

77
51

Panel B: Stockholders with business or other concentrated equity
Wealth percentile
Bottom half 50-90 90-95 95-99 Top 1%
Equity/total assets, %
Concentrated/total equity, %
Concentrated equity/total assets, %

24
90
20

34
63
21

48
44
21

59
44
28

68
45
32

Undiversified/total equity, %
Undiversified equity/total assets, %

80
20

70
24

60
30

69
42

84
58

Participation rate, %

8

30

53

66

83

41

Table IV
Portfolio Allocation: Model
The table presents portfolio allocations produced by the model calibration. Panel A
displays average portfolio shares simulated from the status model with γ = 14, η = 1.
Panel B displays average portfolio shares simulated for the Capitalist Spirit model with
γ = 25, η = 1. Panel C displays average portfolio concentration simulated for the status
utility model with the share of private equity to total assets restricted to be either zero
or at least 20%. The benchmark case has βRi ,Ra = 0.5; the alternative case features
negative aggregate risk exposure of private equity, βRi ,Ra = 1.5.
Panel A: Social Status
Bottom half 50-90

Wealth percentile

90-95

95-99

Top 1%

Equity/total assets, %
Private/total equity, %
Private equity/total assets, %

24
15
5

24
15
5

27
17
6

62
42
30

98
83
82

Portfolio mean return, %
Portfolio std. dev., %
Mean consump. growth, %
Std. cons. growth, %

6
4
2
7

6
4
2
7

6
5
2
8

8
11
5
18

12
22
10
37

90-95

95-99

Top 1%

Panel B: Capitalist Spirit
Bottom half 50-90

Wealth percentile

Equity/total assets, %
Private/total equity, %
Private equity/total assets, %

15
11
2

23
11
3

103
7
7

122
2
3

123
1
1

Portfolio mean return, %
Portfolio std. dev., %

5
3

5
4

12
12

14
14

14
14

Wealth percentile

Panel C: Social Status, restricted
Bottom half 50-90 90-95

Private equity/total assets, bchmrk.
Private equity/total assets, altern.

0
52

42

0
50

1
48

95-99 Top 1%
27
62

82
70

Table V
Wealth Mobility
This table displays probabilities of transition between wealth percentile groups over 10year periods. Panel A reports empirical transition probabilities estimated using the
PSID wealth supplement data for 1984-1999. Panel B reports transition probabilities
simulated in the Social Status model with γ = 10, η = 1. Panel C reports transition
probabilities simulated in the CRRA model with γ = 8, η = 0. Panel D reports transition
probabilities simulated for the calibrated version of the Capitalist Spirit model with η = 1
and γ = 25.
Panel A: data
Wealth quantile Bottom half 50-90 90-95

95-99 Top 1%

Move down
Stay
Move up

0.52
0.44
0.04

0.00
0.89
0.11

0.19
0.73
0.07

0.43
0.32
0.25

0.33
0.67
0.00

Panel B: Social Status
Wealth quantile Bottom half 50-90 90-95

95-99 Top 1%

Move down
Stay
Move up

0.07
0.86
0.07

0.00
0.97
0.03

0.04
0.95
0.02

0.15
0.79
0.06

0.24
0.76
0.00

Panel C: CRRA
Wealth quantile Bottom half 50-90 90-95

95-99 Top 1%

Move down
Stay
Move up

0.09
0.86
0.05

0.00
0.98
0.02

0.04
0.94
0.02

0.13
0.77
0.10

0.05
0.95
0.00

Panel D: Capitalist Spirit
Wealth quantile Bottom half 50-90 90-95

95-99 Top 1%

Move down
Stay
Move up

0.03
0.97
0.00

0.00
1.00
0.00

0.01
0.98
0.01

43

0.06
0.92
0.01

0.03
0.97
0.00

Table VI
Consumption as a Share of Wealth
This table reports consumption over a 10-year period as a share of beginning-of-period
wealth by age and wealth group simulated from the Social Status model with γ = 10,
η = 1.
Wealth quantile Bottom half
20 years old
50 years old
80 years old

50-90

90-95

42
46
60

42
45
59

42
46
60

44

95-99 Top 1%
37
37
43

14
14
14

Risk aversion measures in the status model, γ =10, η = 1
10

Risk aversion

8

6
RRA

RAWRA
4

2

0
0

0.5

1

1.5

2

i

Relative wealth, s

Figure 1. Risk aversion measures. This figure depicts coefficients of relative risk
aversion (RRA) and relative aversion to aggregate wealth risk (RAWRA) as a function
i
of relative wealth, si = W
, in a one-period version of the Social Status model with
W̄
consumption utility curvature γ = 10 and status utility weight η = 1.

45

